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Lynn Adelman* & Jon Deitrich**
By making the federal sentencing guidelines advisory instead
of mandatory, United States v. Booker1 marked a welcome end to a
sad chapter in American law. Although enacted with good
intentions, the United States Sentencing Guidelines constituted
"one of the great failures at law reform in U.S. history."2 No code,
no matter how comprehensive, can identify all of the factors that
should affect a sentence, and in creating the guidelines, the
United States Sentencing Commission ignored many such factors.
Further, by making the code mandatory, Congress and the
Commission prevented courts from imposing just sentences in
many cases. After Booker, judges need no longer impose sentences
that they do not believe in. Booker restored to judges a
meaningful role in sentencing and enabled them to craft sentences
appropriate to the circumstances of a case. At the same time, by
leaving the guidelines intact but making them advisory, Booker
provided an objective marker against which to measure a
sentence. As one observer recently put it; "in its own strange, two-
part way, Booker gets us to a good result. It may lead us as close
to an ideal system as we may ever get - rules moderated by
mercy."3
In this Article, we focus on the new system's promise for
achieving more just sentencing results. In keeping with the
* United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
** Law Clerk, Judge Lynn Adelman, Eastern District of Wisconsin.
1. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
2. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin' Heart(land): The
Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv.
723, 726 (1999).
3. Robb London, Aftermath, SUMMER 2005 HARv. L. BULLETIN 6 (quoting
William Stuntz).
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subject of the present symposium - sentencing rhetoric - we begin
by describing the peculiar rhetoric that characterized sentencing
under the mandatory guidelines and contrast it with the richer
and more meaningful discourse that Booker makes possible. We
then outline a procedure for sentencing post-Booker, discuss the
role of the guidelines in the new system, and offer examples of
how a variety of factors can affect sentencing decisions. We
conclude with a brief discussion of the issue of sentencing
disparity.
I. PRE- AND POST- BOOKER SENTENCING RHETORIC
A member of the public who attended a sentencing proceeding
under the mandatory guideline regime might reasonably have
wondered if she had come to the right place. Although a judge and
counsel were present, they conversed in an unintelligible
language. They did not discuss the defendant's moral culpability,
the reason that he offended, his character and background, the
likelihood that he would re-offend, the effect on the victim, or the
need to protect the public. Rather, the judge and lawyers talked
about offense levels and criminal history scores; about "intended"
versus "actual" loss amounts; about the weight of drugs that it
was reasonably foreseeable the defendant's confederates would
possess; about whether the scheme was "sophisticated" or merely
involved "more than minimal planning." The proceeding was
sterile, the lawyers' arguments and the defendant's allocution
largely irrelevant, and the sentence preordained. As two
commentators described it:
[A] fter thirty or forty minutes of discussion in this double-
speak, the sentencing judge realizes that parties and
spectators in the courtroom are staring ahead in dazed
numbness, having lost all sense of what is happening.
That is when the judge feels bound to pause, to try to
reassure courtroom observers, in comprehensible
language, that the principal interlocutors in the
courtroom do indeed understand what they are talking
about, and that what is going on, though perhaps
unintelligible to them, is indeed honest and fair. This is
sometimes an awkward and embarrassing moment for
the judge, who must try to explain a proceeding that may
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appear as arbitrary to the judge as it does to observers in
the courtroom.
The observer who comes to the contemporary federal
courtroom to witness the dramatic passing of judgment
on a member of the community - to observe the drama of
catharsis, appeals for mercy, appeals for severity, and the
reasoned judgment that takes all of this into account - is
sorely disappointed. That observer finds in today's
federal courtroom precious little discussion of the human
qualities of the victim or the defendant, of the inherently
unquantifiable moral aspects of the defendant's crime, or
of the type of sanction that would best achieve any of the
purposes of sentencing. The "purpose" of sentencing in
the new regime, he will learn, is nothing more and
nothing less than compliance with the Sentencing
Guidelines. 4
Booker makes possible a more meaningful sentencing
proceeding. Although judges and lawyers must still discuss and
resolve guideline disputes, they need no longer limit themselves to
these often arcane issues. In the post-Booker world, 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), not the guidelines, governs sentencing, and it directs
courts to consider traditional sentencing factors such as the
specific circumstances of the case, the character of the defendant,
and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the
offense and to protect the public. By returning such traditional
factors to prominence in sentencing, Booker enables judges and
lawyers to engage in a dialogue that will not frustrate the
participants or the public but rather satisfy their deepest
intuitions about what sentencing should involve. Equally
important, after Booker, a lawyer's arguments and a defendant's
allocution are no longer a charade because they may actually have
an impact on a judge's sentence.
However, Booker will not automatically produce richer
sentencing rhetoric or more meaningful sentencing proceedings;
for its promise to be fulfilled counsel will have to make persuasive
arguments under § 3553(a) and judges will have to use the
4. KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 85 (1998).
2006]
524 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:521
authority that Booker and the statute confer on them. In the
hopes of encouraging and facilitating such use, we turn now to a
discussion of post-Booker sentencing.
II. A THREE-STEP PROCEDURE FOR POST-BOOKER SENTENCING
The first two steps in sentencing after Booker are the same as
they were before Booker: courts must make a calculation under
the applicable guidelines, resolving any factual disputes necessary
to that determination, and consider any requests for departures
from the result pursuant to the Sentencing Commission's policy
statements. However, the third step, the determination of the
actual sentence, has changed. Courts are no longer limited to the
narrow range produced by the Guidelines, but, rather, must
impose sentence based on all of the factors set forth in § 3553(a).5
Section 3553(a) directs courts to consider seven factors:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed -
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment
for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the [advisory guideline] range...;
(5) any pertinent policy statement ... issued by the
Sentencing Commission... ;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities ...
and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense. 6
5. See, e.g., United States v. Page, No. 04-CR-106, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19152, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2005); United States v. Beamon, 373
F. Supp. 2d 878, 880 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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The statute is best understood as operating sequentially.
First, courts must consider the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; in
other words, the specifics of the case before them. Second, they
must evaluate the specifics of the case in light of more general
societal needs such as ensuring that the sentence reflects the
seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, provides
just punishment, affords adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,
and protects the public from further crimes of the defendant.
Finally, courts must translate their findings and impressions into
a numerical sentence. In doing so, they must consider the kinds of
sentences available for the offense (e.g., probation, home or
community confinement, prison, or some combination thereof), the
advisory guideline range, any pertinent policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission, and any restitution due to the
victims of the offense. In imposing a specific sentence, courts
must also consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar backgrounds convicted
of similar offenses. The ultimate directive contained in the
statute is, upon consideration of all of these factors, to impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to satisfy the
purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2). 7  This is the so-called
"parsimony provision," which holds that when more than one
sentence is reasonable in a particular case, courts must choose the
lesser s
III. ROLE OF GUIDELINES
Based on the statutory scheme that remains after Booker's
excision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), 9 courts should give the guidelines
the same weight as the other § 3553(a) factors. 10 Section 3553(a)
contains no suggestion that courts should give any one of the
7. See, e.g., United States v. Peralta-Espinoza, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1107,
1109-10 (E.D. Wis. 2005); United States v. Leroy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894-95
(E.D. Wis. 2005).
8. See United States v. Carey, 368 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 n.4 (E.D. Wis.
2005).
9. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. Section 3553(b) made the guidelines
mandatory, and its excision is what renders them advisory.
10. See United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 986 (E.D. Wis.
2005).
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seven factors greater weight than the others. Although some have
argued that the guidelines take into account the other § 3553(a)
factors and are therefore entitled to great weight, this argument is
flawed. Not only do the guidelines fail to consider all of the §
3553(a) factors, they in fact restrict or prohibit consideration of
certain of them. For instance, the guidelines fail to take into
account and generally forbid departures based on a defendant's
age, education and vocational skills, mental and emotional
condition, physical condition (including drug or alcohol
dependence), employment record, family ties and responsibilities,
socio-economic status, civic and military contributions, and lack of
guidance as a youth." This prohibition cannot be squared with
the § 3553(a)(1) directive that courts consider the "history and
characteristics" of the defendant. 12  The Booker Court itself
recognized that while sentencing courts still had to "consider" the
guidelines, they were free to "tailor the sentence in light of other
statutory concerns as well." 3 If the guidelines fully accounted for
all of the § 3553(a) factors, no tailoring would be necessary.
In our view, judges who declare that, as a matter of policy
they will vary from the guidelines only in unusual cases are not
only operating contrary to § 3553(a) but also disrespecting the
decision of the merits majority in Booker. Imposing sentence
based on disputed facts found by the judge under a preponderance
of the evidence standard, freed from the Rules of Evidence and
Criminal Procedure, violates the Sixth Amendment. 4 Booker
saved the Guidelines only by freeing judges from their grip.
Whether a judge is bound by § 3553(b), as before Booker, or by his
own unwillingness to sentence outside the Guidelines, the result is
the same - the defendant's right to trial by jury is violated. 5
11. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1-.6, .10-.12.
12. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 986; see also United States v. Dean, 414
F.3d 725, 730-31 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that "the defendant must be given
an opportunity to draw the judge's attention to any factor listed in section
3553(a) that might warrant a sentence different from the guidelines sentence,
for it is possible for such a variant sentence to be reasonable and thus within
the sentencing judge's discretion under the new regime in which the
guidelines, being advisory, can be trumped by section 3553(a), which as we
have stressed is mandatory").
13. 125 S. Ct. at 757.
14. Id. at 756.
15. Although the Seventh Circuit has held that a sentence imposed
within a properly calculated guideline range is, on appeal, entitled to a
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However, for several reasons the guidelines will continue to
play an important role in sentencing. First, of the § 3553(a)
factors, the guidelines are the only ones that suggest a numerical
sentence. Although in any given case the numerical sentence
called for by the guidelines may be entirely arbitrary,16 merely by
supplying a number, the guidelines offer sentencing courts a
starting point. Second, by assigning numbers to a variety of
factors that may be relevant to sentencing, the guidelines provide
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, e.g., United States v. Mykytiuk,
415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005), this does not mean that district courts
must also operate under that presumption. Indeed, to do so would violate
Booker. See United States v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1028 (S.D. Iowa
2005) ("To treat the Guidelines as presumptive is to concede the converse,
i.e., that any sentence imposed outside the Guideline range would be
presumptively unreasonable .... If presumptive, the Guidelines would
continue to overshadow the other factors listed in section 3553(a), causing an
imbalance in the application of the statute to a particular defendant by
making the Guidelines, in effect, still mandatory."); see also United States v.
Jordan, No. 05-1296, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 812, at *14 (7th Cir. Jan. 13,
2006) (holding that there is no presumption of unreasonableness that
attaches to a sentence outside the range).
16. The Commission has never adequately explained how it came up with
its proposed numerical sentences. It initially said that the guidelines
mirrored past practices, but it later said that they did not. See Miller &
Wright, supra note 2, at 752. To the extent that the Commission did consider
past practice, commentators have questioned its methodology. See, e.g.,
Morris E. Lasker & Katherine Oberlies, The Medium or the Message? A
Review of Alschuler's Theory of Why the Sentencing Guidelines Have Failed, 4
FED. SENT'G REP. 166, 167 (Nov./Dec. 1991) ("The Commission's decision to
calculate average pre-guideline sentences by counting only incarcerative
sentences has produced sentences that are both substantially higher than
pre-guideline sentences and higher than necessary to achieve the purposes of
sentencing."). Further, the Commission in some areas departed from past
practice and for ill-defined policy reasons decided to impose harsher
sentences. See, e.g., Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the "Junior Varsity
Congress": A Call for Meaningful Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1199, 1221 (1999) (stating that the guidelines in
public corruption cases called for sentences considerably higher than the pre-
guidelines average); Louis F. Oberdorfer, Lecture: Mandatory Sentencing:
One Judge's Perspective-2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11, 15 (Winter 2003)
(stating that "the sentencing ranges for drug law violations were
demonstrably higher, and the resulting sentences longer, than the
pre-guidelines averages and means"). The increases called for in illegal re-
entry cases were particularly harsh and arbitrarily implemented. See United
States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (E.D. Wis. 2005)
(discussing sixteen level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1, which was not
supported by study or research, but rather suggested by one Commissioner
and passed with little discussion).
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courts with a means of quantifying non-guideline sentences. 17
Third, because Booker left intact § 3553(c), courts must continue
to provide written reasons for sentences outside the guidelines.
IV. EXAMPLES OF FACTORS THAT CAN AFFECT SENTENCES
In drafting § 3553(a), Congress used very general terms. As a
result, the statute encompasses a virtually unlimited number of
factors that can affect sentences. We offer some illustrative
examples.
A. Good Character
Although § 3553(a)(1) requires courts to consider the history
and characteristics of the defendant, and § 3661 declares that
there shall be no limit on the information concerning the
defendant's character and background which the court may
receive and consider, the guidelines focus almost exclusively on
defendants' past criminal activities. In other words, in setting the
imprisonment range, the guidelines consider only the bad things
about the defendant and none of the good.18 Thus, under the
mandatory guidelines, courts typically had to impose virtually the
same sentence on defendants who possessed positive character
traits as on those who did not. Fortunately, § 3553(a) recognizes
that defendants deserve to be judged based on more than their
worst moments, and after Booker courts may treat defendants as
whole people and sentence them based on all of their
characteristics. 19
B. Motive
Similarly, under the mandatory guideline regime, courts had
17. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 381 F. Supp. 2d 884, 890 (E.D.
Wis. 2005); Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 964.
18. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1715
(June 1992) ("Perhaps no provisions in the guidelines evoke more dismay
from the federal judiciary, the probation service, and the bar than the policy
statements [which] declare many personal characteristics of an offender to be
'not ordinarily relevant' to sentencing outside the applicable guideline
range.").
19. See, e.g., United States v. Page, No. 04-CR-106, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19152, at *12 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2005); United States v. Ranum, 353
F. Supp. 2d 984, 990-91 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
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to impose the same sentence on a defendant who stole $100,000 to
pay for an operation for his sick child as on one who stole $100,000
to buy a yacht. This was so because, in white-collar cases, the
guidelines focus almost exclusively on loss amount and largely
ignore other measures of moral culpability. However, as indicated
by the above example, defendants can cause the same amount of
economic loss without being equally culpable. A person who
offends as the result of difficult personal circumstances may be
more deserving of leniency (as well as less likely to re-offend) than
a defendant who steals out of greed or opportunism. 20 Similarly, a
defendant who offends without seeking substantial personal gain
or intending to harm another may be more entitled to leniency
than one who acts out of avarice or malice. 21
C. Acceptance of Responsibility, Genuine Remorse and Payment of
Restitution
Under the mandatory guidelines, courts could grant a two- or
three-level reduction in offense level if the defendant timely
pleaded guilty. 22 Although courts could consider a variety of
factors in determining whether to grant the reduction for
acceptance of responsibility (e.g., voluntary withdrawal from
criminal conduct, payment of restitution, surrender to authorities,
or post-offense rehabilitative efforts), 23 these additional factors
were usually irrelevant. If the defendant pleaded in time, he got
the reduction.
After Booker, courts are no longer restricted by the narrow
parameters of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, but rather may grant additional
consideration to defendants who demonstrate acceptance beyond
that necessary to obtain a two- or three-level reduction under the
guideline. For example, a court might conclude that a defendant
who voluntarily acknowledged criminal conduct before it was
discovered and turned over all of his assets to the victim in an
effort to make restitution was entitled to a greater reduction
because such conduct was relevant to his character and to the
20. See United States v. Milne, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1312 n.4 (E.D. Wis.
2005).
21. See Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
22. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2005).
23. Id. at § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1.
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likelihood that he would re-offend. Booker allows courts to
recognize in their sentencing practices that it is desirable to
encourage offenders to "mitigate their misconduct voluntarily,
whether by admitting it, paying restitution or making efforts to
address substance abuse, mental health or other problems that
contributed to it."24
D. The Girlfriend Problem
Under § 3553(a) (but not the guidelines), courts may take into
consideration the reality that defendants sometimes become
involved in criminal conduct based on their relationships with
others. Courts frequently see this phenomenon at work when they
sentence women who assisted their husbands, boyfriends or male
relatives in illegal drug-related activities.25 The guidelines direct
courts to sentence women in such situations based on the drug
weight foreseeable to them regardless of whether they personally
handled such an amount, and generally fail to take into account
the often abusive or coercive relationships that led to the woman's
involvement.
In too many cases, women are punished for the act of
remaining with a boyfriend or husband engaged in drug activity,
who is typically the father of her children. Many of these women
have histories of physical and sexual abuse and/or untreated
mental illness. Ill-informed policies spawned by the war on drugs
adversely impact children. In 1999 almost 1.5 million minor
children had an incarcerated parent, with over 65% of women
incarcerated in state prison having a minor child. The children
are often placed in the care of friends or family-often leading to
financial and emotional hardships-or end up in an overburdened
child welfare system where they are at increased risk of becoming
victims of sexual or physical abuse or neglect.26
Freed from the strictures of the guidelines, courts may factor
such matters into their sentences where appropriate.27
24. Milne, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1312.
25. See United States v. Greer, 375 F. Supp. 2d 790, 794-95 (E.D. Wis.
2005).
26. Id. (quoting Legislative Briefing on The Girlfriend Problem,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw and-policy/2005/06/legislative
_bri.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2005)).
27. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 allows courts to grant a two to four level reduction
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E. Crack/Powder Disparity
As is now notorious, both the Controlled Substances Act and
the guidelines treat one gram of crack cocaine the same as one
hundred grams of powder cocaine. 28 During the mandatory
guideline regime, defendants challenged this disparity in every
conceivable way without success. 29  However, now that the
guidelines are advisory, courts need no longer sentence crack
defendants based on the 100:1 ratio, which lacks any persuasive
penological or scientific justification and produces a racially
disproportionate impact. 30 Indeed, courts across the country have,
in post-Booker cases, declined to follow the 100:1 ratio.31
Some commentators have suggested that it is inappropriate
for courts to address the crack/powder disparity; others warn that
deviations from the guidelines on this basis could spur Congress to
enact a legislative Booker-fix. 32 However, judges cannot allow
such considerations to prevent them from doing what is just in a
particular case. The evidence in favor of narrowing or eliminating
the gap between crack and powder cocaine is overwhelming; no
one, as far as we are aware, supports the 100:1 ratio on the
merits. It would be unseemly for the courts to blindly adhere to a
sentencing scheme they know to be unjust based on the
speculation that, if they don't, Congress may come up with
something worse.
F. Enabling Defendants to Pay Restitution
The mandatory Guidelines generally barred courts from
for mitigating role in the offense. However, in cases where the drug weight
produces a high base offense level, this reduction is often insufficient.
28. See 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1) (2005); 18 U.S.C. app. § 2D1.1(c) (2005).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1992).
30. United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 777-82 (E.D. Wis. 2005);
see also Beamon, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 886-87 (collecting cases).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 307 (D.R.I.
2005) ("The growing sentiment in the district courts is clear: the advisory
Guideline range for crack cocaine based on the 100:1 ratio cannot withstand
the scrutiny imposed by sentencing courts when the § 3553 factors are
applied."). But see United States v. Pho, No. 05-2455, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
153 (1st Cir. Jan. 5, 2006) (holding that district courts cannot reject the 100:1
ratio).
32. See Pamela A. MacLean, Cracking the Code: After 'Booker' Judges
Reduce Crack Cocaine Sentences, NAT'L L.J. Oct. 3, 2005, at 1.
2006]
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downwardly departing in order to enhance a defendant's ability to
pay restitution. 33 However, § 3553(a)(7) directs sentencing courts
to consider the need to provide restitution to crime victims. In
some situations, this directive may justify fashioning a sentence to
enhance a defendant's ability to pay. This is not an improper
consideration of the defendant's "socio-economic status," nor is it
an invitation to the rich to buy their way out of prison. Rather, in
cases in which a restitution obligation is manageable, the
defendant is employed and making a genuine effort to pay, and a
prison sentence would cause him to lose his job, the court may
consider the use of home or community confinement in order to
facilitate payment efforts. 34
G. Unusual Personal Circumstances
Not infrequently, courts encounter cases where defendants
have undergone unusual and significant experiences that may be
relevant to their sentences. Although, in theory, the mandatory
guidelines authorized departures in certain unusual cases, in
practice courts rarely granted them. Further, appellate courts
policed downward departures with unwarranted and inexplicable
zeal.35 Now that the guidelines are advisory, courts are free to
impose just sentences in cases where a traumatic experience
contributes to an offender's misconduct. We offer two examples.
1. Michael Page
Michael Page was a forty-five-year-old man with no prior
record, a solid work history, and a stable home and family life.
One day, an acquaintance, Johnny Ray White, asked Page to drive
him to a bank so that he could make a deposit. Unbeknownst to
Page, White planned to rob the bank. White completed the crime,
returned to the car, and Page, still unaware, drove away. Soon
33. See, e.g., United States v. Chastain, 84 F.3d 321, 324-25 (9th Cir.
1996) (collecting cases).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1062 (E.D.
Wis. 2005).
35. See generally Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason
Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM L. REV. 19, 83 (2003) ("One of the
'mysteries' of the Guidelines experience is that many appellate courts have
opted to enforce them more rigidly than anyone predicted or than the
relevant statutes appear to require.").
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after, a squad car with lights flashing pulled behind Page, at
which point White told him to "hit it" because he had just robbed
the bank. Instead of pulling over as he should have, Page took off.
He was subsequently arrested and charged with being an
accessory after the fact to bank robbery. 36
At sentencing, Page argued that his decision to flee was in
part the product of a traumatic experience. Several years
previously, his son Michael had been involved in a high speed
chase with police during which he called 911 and stated that he
was frightened and intended to drive home. Michael then pulled
into the driveway of Page's home, and although he was unarmed,
a police officer shot and killed him after he got out of the car.
Page witnessed the incident, saw his son die, and was left with a
profound distrust of law enforcement. He argued that when he
saw the flashing lights, he fled because he feared that the police
would harm him.37 Of course, this was an unreasonable choice.
But Page did not argue that his past trauma negated his guilt of
the offense. Rather, under these circumstances, Page's prior
experience bore on the extent of his culpability.38
2. Quandella Johnson
Quandella Johnson had a horrific childhood. For years, her
father, a convicted sex offender, and his friends abused her
sexually, physically and emotionally. Not surprisingly, she
developed mental health and substance abuse problems and
attached herself to abusive men. One of them involved her in
several bank robberies, which resulted in a sixty-three month
prison sentence. While in prison, Johnson made great strides,
completing drug treatment, obtaining her GED, and taking
various other classes. Upon her release, she got custody of her
children. However, she soon began to have problems, using drugs,
missing appointments and counseling sessions, and failing to pay
restitution. These problems led to the revocation of her
supervised release and another prison sentence. 39
36. United States v. Page, No. 04-CR-106, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19152,
at *1, *8-9 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2005).
37. Id. at *8-12.
38. Id. at *10-12.
39. United States v. Johnson, No. 05-CR-80, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15742, at *2-3 (E.D. Wis. July 25, 2005).
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The judge gave Johnson a date to report to prison but she
failed to appear, leading to the issuance of a warrant for her arrest
and a new criminal charge under 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2). 40
However, Johnson had not fled the jurisdiction or gone into hiding
to avoid law enforcement. Rather, she failed to report because she
had not found anyone to care for her children during her sentence.
Rather than requesting an extension until she could resolve her
child care problems, she sat in her home and cried, waiting for the
Marshal to come for her. When deputies arrived, she opened the
door, turned and placed her hands behind her back without being
ordered to do so, and was taken to jail. Based on these facts,
Johnson was entitled to sentencing consideration. "In the
hierarchy of failure to surrender cases, a depressed mother who
stays home with her children for an extra six days around
Christmas has to rank among the least serious."41
V. A WORD ABOUT DISPARITY
We conclude with a discussion of the issue of sentencing
disparity, which opponents of advisory guidelines most frequently
mention as the reason for restricting judicial discretion. There are
several answers to this criticism of the advisory guideline regime.
The easiest is that judges continue to impose sentences within the
guidelines in nearly sixty-two percent of all cases, only a slight
reduction from the years before Booker.42 More importantly,
though, there is no evidence that the mandatory guidelines
created sentencing uniformity in any meaningful sense.43 In fact,
under the mandatory guidelines, racial disparity in sentencing
actually increased.44  With respect to disparity, Stith and
Cabranes concluded that:
40. Section 3146(a)(2) proscribes failure to surrender for service of a
sentence.
41. Johnson, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15742 at *11.
42. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT
7 (Dec. 1, 2005) available at http://www.ussc.gov/bf.HTM.
43. See, e.g., Michael O'Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 27 FED. SENT'G
REP. 249 (Apr. 2005).
44. United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 780 (E.D. Wis. 2005)
('Before the guidelines took effect, white federal defendants received an
average sentence of 51 months and blacks an average of 55 months. After the
guidelines took effect, the average sentence for whites dropped to 50 months,
but the average sentence for blacks increased to 71 months.").
FULFILLING BOOKER'S PROMISE
1. Inter-judge sentence variation was not as rampant or as
"shameful" in the federal courts under the pre-Guidelines regime
as Congress apparently believed when it enacted the Sentencing
Reform Act in 1984.
2. No thorough empirical study has demonstrated a reduction
in the total amount of disparity under the Guidelines
3. While reduction of inter-judge disparity is a worthwhile
goal for sentencing reform, it is a complex goal, and a myopic focus
on this objective can result in a system that too often ignores
other, equally important goals of a just sentencing system.
Uniformity can itself be "unwarranted": when unprincipled, blind
uniformity itself promotes inequality.
4. Important sources of disparity remain in the Guidelines
regime, some acknowledged and others hidden from view. In
particular, the exercise of the prosecutorial function is, despite the
efforts of both the Sentencing Commission and the Department of
Justice, inevitably a wellspring of disparate treatment. This does
not mean that prosecutorial discretion should be suppressed, but
rather that prosecutors should exercise discretion in the open,
where it can be observed and, if necessary, checked by judges.45
Therefore, rather than worshiping the false idol of uniformity,
we should focus on doing justice in individual cases. The regime
now in place gives judges guidelines which are just that - guides
in the exercise of discretion. Judges need not sentence different
people the same just because their offense levels and criminal
history scores call for identical terms. Further, because judges are
sworn to uphold the law and will conscientiously fulfill their duty
to protect the public when necessary, the notion that without
mandates judges will jeopardize public safety is as insulting as it
is unsupported. And, appellate review remains available for any
sentence that is demonstrably unreasonable, either because it is
too high or too low. Moreover, reinstating mandatory guidelines
will do little to eliminate disparity as it exists now. Rather, its
effect will be to transfer sentencing authority from judges to
prosecutors, whose charging decisions, rather than the offender's
conduct and background, will drive the sentence.
Finally, we note that there are many forms of disparity in this
country. Criminal defendants are more likely to be poor and
45. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 106.
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uneducated, unemployed, come from broken homes, have a history
of childhood abuse or neglect, and suffer from mental health or
substance abuse problems.46 Perhaps the national discussion on
crime control and correctional policy should focus more on these
disparities, which antedate the commission of crime, rather than
on ensuring that everyone gets the same amount of time in prison
after the fact.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under our system of justice, judges, not prosecutors, are
supposed to sentence defendants. 47  Booker represents a
tremendous advance because for the first time in almost twenty
years, courts are allowed to fulfill their sentencing
responsibilities. However, the courts and counsel will have to
work hard to ensure that Booker's promise is fulfilled.
46. See, e.g., Daniel P. Mears, Health Law in the Criminal Justice System
Symposium: Mental Health Needs and Services in the Criminal Justice
System, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POLy 255, 268-69 (2004) ("Jail and prison
populations typically have higher rates of poverty and substance abuse.");
Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 25, 47
(1994) ("Most felony defendants, whatever their race, tend to be poor,
ill-educated, un- or underemployed, and not part of a stable household.").
47. See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, AG's Misguided Proposals, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 19, 2005, at 30.
